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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was

Electric's

the

Tax

Commission's

(Arco's)Petition

for

decision

failure

to

to

dismiss

attend

the

Arco

status

conference supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light
of the whole record before the Court?
requires

the

Court

to

examine

the

The standard of review

record

for

"such

relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion." R.10-13 Harken Southwest Corp. v. Board of Oil Gas
and Mining, 920 P.2d 1176, 1180 (Utah 1996); Utah Administrative
Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-16(g).
2.

Whether, assuming the agency's action in dismissing Arco's

Petition is supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light
of the whole record before the court, such dismissal was arbitrary,
capricious, or unconstitutional, as it has been applied. R. 10-13.
To the extent that the decision is one based on constitutionally, the review of the agency's decision is done solely for
correctness.

Elks

Lodge's

#719

(Ogden)

and

#2021

(Moab) v.

Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 905 P.2d 1189, 1193 (Utah
1995) .
tute

an

To determine if the actions of the Tax Commission constiabuse

of

discretion,

or

if

they

were

arbitrary

and

capricious; this Court will evaluate them subject to an intermediate type of review which requires the Appellate Court to affirm the
agency action if it was reasonable and rational.
Industries,

Inc. v.

Auditing

Division

of

the Utah

Commission, 849 P.2d 1167, 1173-74 (Utah 1993).

See SEMENCQ
State

Tax

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the final Order of the Utah State Tax
Commission, dated March 7, 1997, dismissing Arco's Petition for
Redetermination.

Jurisdiction was originally proper in the Utah

Supreme Court, pursuant to U.C.A., §78-2-2 (3) (e) (ii) , and it is
proper

in this Court pursuant

to the pour over provisions as

contained in Utah Code Annotated, §78-2-2(4).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
The determinative

constitutional

provisions,

statutes

and

rules in this case are cited below and are reproduced herein as
Addendum B.
U.S. Const. Amend XIV
Utah Const. Art. 2 §7
U.C.A. §59-1-504 (1953 as amended)
U.C.A. §63-46b-8 (1953 as amended)
U.C.A. §63-46b-ll (1953 as amended)
U.C.A. §63-46b-16 (1953 as amended)
U.C.A. §78-2-2 (1953 as amended)
Utah Admin Code R. 8 61-1A-1
Utah Admin Code R. 861-1A-3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was commenced with a filing of a Petition for
Redetermination challenging two separate assessments made by the
Utah

State

Tax

Commission's

Auditing

Division

for

deficiencies in the collection of sales tax. R. 39-41.
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alleged

The two matters were designated as Account Nos. GO3708 and
GO2500.

R. 39. As the issues raised in the two petitions were

identical to issues already being pursued by the Tax Commission in
other formal proceedings and before the Utah Supreme Court, the
parties stipulated to a stay of this case until the other appeals
were decided. R. 35; R. 11; Addendum C

l

.

The issues in the appeal on Account No. GO2500 were determined
by the Utah Supreme Court in the favor of Arco.

Arco Electric v.

Utah State Tax Commission, 860 P.2d 330 (Utah 1993) . Subsequently,
the Auditing Division amended its assessment to zero, and that
portion of the Petition was dismissed by the Administrative Law
Judge. Addendum D.
The remaining issue in the petition, was an assessment for
sales tax which allegedly should have been procured from Pepcon for
work and materials provided by Arco
Pepcon facility in Cedar City, Utah.

on the construction of the
R. 11. The Tax Commission had

also begun proceedings directly against Pepcon alleging the failure
to pay the sales tax as required. Addendum C.
While waiting in that posture, the Administrative Law Judge
scheduled a status conference, and notice was purportedly sent to
Arco, Arco's counsel and the Attorney General's Office.

1

R.23.

The

In reviewing the record for this appeal, Arco's counsel
discovered the record is incomplete.
The Tax Commission has
created two separate files, one for case 93-0237 and one for case
93-0337. Pleadings, correspondence and Orders directly relating to
this case are contained in the file for 93-0337, which has not been
designated a part of the record by the Tax Commission. Arco has
copied those parts of that file it believes are relevant to this
appeal and reproduced them herein at Addendums C and D.
-3-

mailing certificate shows notice of the conference was not sent to
Arco, but to the former address of Arco f s counsel.

The mailing

certificate does purport the Notice was sent to Arco 's counsel.
Arco's counsel did not receive the Notice allegedly sent.
10.

R.

Accordingly, no one appeared at the scheduling conference on

behalf

of Arco. R.

20.

An Order of Default

was entered

on

11/27/96. R. 20. Arco filed a request for reconsideration with the
Utah State Tax Commission. R. 10.

That request was denied. R. 4.

A Petition for Review of Order was filed with the Utah Supreme
Court on April 17, 1997. R. 3.
The following facts are relevant to the issues presented to
the Court for this review.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Following audits by the Auditing Division of the Utah

State Tax Commission in 1992, assessments were made against Arco.
R. 39-41.
2.

Those assessments showed up under two separate account

numbers, GO3 708 and GO2500. R. 39.
3.

Arco

Electric

filed

a

Petition

for

Redetermination

challenging the assessments under the two account numbers.
41.

R.39-

The combined appeals were assigned the case number 920237 and

it was under that number that the Auditing Division responded to
the initial Petition for Redetermination. R. 35.
4.

The

issues

relating

to

account

number

GO3708

were

identical to the issues which Arco had before the Utah Supreme
Court in Case Number 920182. R.35
-4-

5.

The parties agreed to stay further action on those issues,

pending a decision by the Court. Addendum C.
6.

In a decision, dated September 22, 1993, the Court ruled

in favor of Arco on the issues present under account number GO3708.
Arco Electric v. Utah State Tax Commission, 860 P.2d 330

(Utah

1993) .
7.
Office

Arco's
and

counsel

requested

a

contacted the Utah Attorney Generalf s
dismissal

with

respect

to

the

issues

contained in account number GO3708, but the Attorney General's
Office declined.

Subsequently, the Auditing Division amended its

assessment under that account number to zero, and the matter was
ultimately dismissed by Administrative Law Judge, Gail S. Reich.
Addendum D.
8.

Account

number

GO2500

involves

issues

relating

to

materials and services provided at the Pepcon facility in Cedar
City, Utah. R. 11.
9.

The Auditing Division made a similar assessment against

Pepcon directly, and Pepcon filed a Petition for Redetermination on
that issue. Addendum C.
10.

In a Pre-hearing Order on November 23, 1993, A.L.J. Alan

Henebold ruled that the appeals on both cases were to be held in
abeyance until the other appeals were decided.
11.

As of this date, counsel for Arco

Addendum C.
has not received a

written communication identifying the resolution of the Pepcon
appeal. R. 11.

-5-

12.

Arco's counsel has received verbal information that the

Pepcon matter has been resolved. R. 11.
13.

To confirm that information, Arco's counsel sent a letter

to the Attorney General's Office asking for information relating to
the

outcome

of

the

assessment,

but

no

such

information

was

forthcoming except for an oral statement that the matter had been
settled. R.ll
14.

Administrative Law Judge Gail S. Reich, decided to hold

a status conference in the fall of 1996. R. 23.
15.

A notice of the Status Conference was allegedly sent to

counsel for Arco at his office. R.23.
16.

Counsel for Arco

did not receive a copy of the Notice of

Status Conference. R.10.
17.

A Notice of Status Conference was allegedly sent to

Arco, but the address used was the former office address of Arco 's
counsel, not Arco's address. R. 23.
18.

The Tax Commission knew the address it mailed the Notice

to, for Arco, was not Arco's address.
19.

See Addendum D pg. 3.

Arco did not receive a copy of the Notice of Status

Conference. R.ll.
20.

Arco's

counsel

first

became

aware

that

the

status

conference had been called when he received a copy of the notice
that Arco's appeal had been dismissed based on failure of Arco

or

Arco's counsel to appear at the status conference. R.ll.
21.

Arco's counsel filed a Request for Reconsideration with

the Utah State Tax Commission. R.10.
-6-

22.

The request was unopposed by the Auditing Division. R. 8.

23. The request was denied by the Tax Commission. R. 4.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Authority to default a Petitioner in a formal adjudicative
proceeding is found in the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UCA
§63-46b-ll(b)(1)).

The statute requires two conditions to be met

before such an extreme sanction can be imposed; (1) There must be
proper notice of the formal evidentiary hearing, and
Petitioner must receive such notice.

(2) the

The record in this case

plainly demonstrates that neither condition was met in this case.
Arco was defaulted for failing to appear at a "Status Conference".

A "Status Conference" is not a "hearing" as that phrase is

used in the UAPA.

Furthermore, the "Notice" that was sent, of the

"Status Conference", was not sent to the Petitioner.

The mailing

certificate of the "Notice" plainly state that rather than sending
it to the Petitioner, it was sent to a former address of Petitioner's counsel. It was sent there even though the Tax Commission
knew the address was incorrect and that mail sent to that address
had previously been returned as undeliverable.

While the mailin

certificate does purport the "Notice" was sent to the correct
address of Petitioner's counsel, that factor is irrelevant.

The

plain language of the Statute clearly requires service on the
Petitioner, not its counsel.
In its Order denying the Petitioner's request for reconsideration, the Tax Commission does not find actual receipt of the
"Notice" by either Petitioner or its counsel. Nor is such a finding
-7-

possible based on the record which the Tax Commission had to base
its "Order" upon.
states

The only evidence or argument presented clearly

that neither the Petitioner nor its counsel actually

received the "Notice". Therefore, even if the plain language of the
statute could be ignored and proper notice received by counsel for
a petitioner could substitute for actual notice received by the
Petitioner, there was no receipt nor any finding of the same by the
Commission and the Order must be reversed.
Alternate authority exists in the Utah Administrative Code
whereby the Tax Commission may enter the Default of a party
participating

in

formal

adjudicative

proceedings.

Like the

requirement in the UAPA, Rule 861-1A-1 (G) (1) (b) provides for a
default where "[a] party to a formal adjudicative proceeding fails
to attend or participate in a hearing".

The Adminstative Code

makes a clear distinction between a hearing, where default is
allowed, and a conference.

Rule 861-1A-1A(7) and Rule 861-1A-

1A(5) . Nowhere in the Administrative Code is there authorization
for defaulting a Petition for failing to attend a conference.
In light of the argument above, Petitioner was denied due
process, through the dismissal of its properly made protest of the
wrongful tax assessment. Where Petitioner met its duties under the
statutes for having its protest heard, the termination of that
right where notice was inadequate and where the statute and Rules
governing

the Tax Commission do not provide such an extreme

punishment even if the Notice had been adequate.

-8-

Those same arguments also show the acts of the Tax Commission
were arbitrary and capricious.

Under the facts of this case, the

failure of Petitioner to attend or participate in a scheduling
conference, where the Petitioner had absolutely nothing to add(all
information necessary to resolve this case being within the sole
control of the Tax Commission), does not justify the extreme result
of the termination of Arco's Petition.
the

Petition

has

major

impact

on

While the termination of

Petitioner,

the

failure

of

Petitioner to attend the status conference in no way impacted the
Tax Commission's ability to fully and fairly resolve the issues
before it.

The only contribution Petitioner could have made at the

scheduling conference, would have been to say it had *not received
formal notice of the resolution of the Pepcon case.

This was

something the Commission already knew.
Neither

the

facts of

this

case nor

the

sanction imposed by the Tax Commission.

law

support

Therefore

the

Petitioner

respectfully request the Order dismissing the Petition be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I. THE RECORD FAILS TO SUPPORT THE PURPORTED RATIONALE BEHIND
THE TAX COMMISSION'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL.
The rules governing the requirements for the default of a
party

participating

in

a

formal

administrative

contained in Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-11.

procedure

are

The portion of that

statute specifically applicable to this action states:
(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default
against a party if:

-9-

(b) A party to a formal adjudicative proceeding
fails to attend or participate in a properly
scheduled

hearing,

after

receiving

proper

notice;

(emphasis added).
The governing statute clearly establishes a prerequisite of
two things that must take place prior to a party being defaulted in
a formal adjudicative proceeding.

The first requirement is that

the hearing be properly scheduled, while the second is that the
party receive proper notice.

The ruling of the Tax Commission

ignores the requirement of actual receipt and instead focuses on
the proper scheduling of the hearing.

In its decision and Order,

the Tax Commission stated:
As for the Petition for Reconsideration concerning Appeal No.
93-0237, Petitioner raises the issue of notice of the status
conference which led to the dismissal. Petitioner points out
that notice was not sent to the Petitioner.
However, the
Petitioner acknowledges that the notice was properly sent to
the correct address of Petitioner's attorney of record.
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, it is the decision and
order of the Utah State Tax Commission, that the Petition for
Reconsideration be denied.
R.4.
The

Commission's

separate aspects.
actually received.

decision

and

Order

is

flawed

in

three

First, there is no finding that the Notice was
Only that it was sent.

Second, the Commission

specifically found that Notice was not properly sent to Arco, but
was, allegedly, properly sent to Arco's counsel.
absolutely no support

Third, there is

in the record or anywhere

Commission's statement that Arco

else

for the

acknowledged "that the Notice was

properly sent to the correct address of Arco's attorney of record
in this matter."

-10-

The sole items of evidence, contained within the record, which
the Commission could purportedly use to support its decision to
sustain the default of the Petition in this matter are: (1) The
Notice of Status Conference, dated August 6, 1996(R. 23), (2)the
Order of Default, signed November 27, 1996 (R. 20), (3) the Request
for Reconsideration, dated December 16, 1996 (R. 10) and (4) the
response to Arco

f

s Request for Reconsideration, dated February 7,

1997 (R. 8) .
Of these items, the Response to Arco
eration,

is

simply

a

two

sentence

f

s Request for Reconsid-

statement

by

the Auditing

Division that they had decided to decline to respond to the Request
for Reconsideration.

Other than showing that the Auditing Division

had no objection to the request, this document provides no support
or evidence for the Commission's decision to default Arco.
The Notice of Status Conference gives evidence that a notice
was prepared.

The mailing certificate attached purports to claim

that the Notice was sent to Arco

at 660 South 200 East, Suite 301,

Salt Lake City, UT 84111, which is not Arco's address, nor has it
ever been. R. 23; R.ll.

It further purports to stand for the

proposition the Notice was mailed to Arco's counsel at his address
at 4516 South 700 East, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, UT 84107. R.23.
The

original

neither Arco

Order of

Default

establishes

the

fact

that

nor its counsel appeared at the status conference,

but otherwise provides no new information. R. 20.

The final item,

the Request for Reconsideration filed by Arco, does not provide any
support for the Commission's decision. R. 10.
-11-

A. Default Was Improper Because the Notice of the Status
Conference Was Not Received.
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act
administrative

agency

cases

initiated

after

(UAPA) governs all
January

1, 1988.

Dusty 1 s. Inc. v. Auditing Division of Utah State Tax Commission,
842 P.2d 869, 870 (Utah 1992).

The UAPA specifies the conditions

under which an agency may enter the default of a participant in
formal adjudicative proceedings.

Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-

11(1) (b) .
The plain language of the statute clearly requires both proper
notice and receipt of notice prior to the entering of a default
against a participant in formal adjudicative proceedings.

See

Nelsen v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995) (" . . .
This Court is guided by the principle that a statute is generally
construed according to its plain language.")

The Decision and

Order of the Tax Commission makes no finding that there was ever
actual receipt of the Notice, only that the Notice was sent. R. 4.
In its Decision and Order, the Tax Commission states, "Petitioner

points out that notice was not sent to the Petitioner.

However, the Petitioner acknowledges that the Notice was properly
sent to the correct address of Petitioner's attorney of record in
this matter."

R.5.

There is absolutely no evidence in the record

to support this finding.

Indeed, the only reference made to these

factors by Arco 's counsel, appears in the Request for Reconsideration.

Beginning on Page 1 of the Request for Reconsideration, it

states:

-12-

Neither Petitioner nor his counsel, received notice of the
status conference. A check of the mailing certificate, lists
the Petitioner's address as 660 South 200 East, Suite 301,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. That is not now, now has it ever
been the address of the Petitioner . In fact, that address is
the former address ' of Petitioner's counsel.
Petitioner's
counsel had notified the Commission and opposing counsel that
he had moved from that location the 1st of December, 1995. The
address set forth for the attorney for Petitioner is correct.
Attorney for Petitioner has no idea what happened to the
Petition sent to that address if the Petition was sent to that
address as the mailing certificate claims.
R. 11.
Nowhere in this statement does Arco's counsel admit that the
Notice was properly sent.

Indeed, Arco's counsel's statement makes

it clear he never received notice of the conference, nor did he
know whether the Petition had been sent at all.

Even were the

Commission's findings correct, they would be irrelevant.

U.C.A.

§63-46b-ll (1) (b) requires-, by its plain language, that notice must
be both sent and received by the party.

The Utah Supreme Court has

stated:
We presume that the Legislature used each word advisedly and
give effect to each term according to its ordinary and
accepted meaning. We must be guided by the law as it is . .
. when language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to
mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction.
Nelson v. Salt Lake County, at 875 (Citations omitted).

See also

MacKay v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 630-631 (Utah 1995).
If

the

Legislature

wished

to make

notice

effective

upon

mailing, it could have done so by setting forth the appropriate
language in the Statute. See e.g. UCA §59-1-504. Instead, it chose
to focus on actual receipt.
The Tax Commission's failure to find actual receipt requires
the Tax Commission's order be reversed.
-13-

B.

The Tax Commission Did Not Send Proper Notice To Arco.

Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-ll specifically requires that the

party

to the formal adjudicative

proceeding

must receive

proper

The undisputed facts in this case establish that Arco

did not

notice.

receive notice.

Indeed, the Tax Commission already knew that

Petitioner was not at the address where the notice was sent.
Addendum D pg. 3.

Even if the Court were to accept the Tax

Commission's unsupported finding that Arco's counsel received
notice of the hearing, the statute specifically requires proper
notice go to the party.

Nothing in the Statute provides that

notice to a party's counsel meets the requisite notice necessary in
order for a default to be entered.
The Notice of the Status Conference clearly set forth an
improper address for Arco. The Auditing Division and the State Tax
Commission had the correct address for Arco, and indeed performed
the field audit at Arco's business. They also knew the address for
Petitioner, where they sent the Notice of the Status Conference,
was not correct.

Addendum D pg. 3.

The Tax Commission recognized the necessity of notifying Arco
directly. That is why the Commission attempted to send the Notice
to Arco.

The Statute does not contain language allowing notice to

counsel for a petitioner to substitute for actual notice sent to
the petitioner

itself.

A Court may not insert substantive terms

into statutory text which are not present. Webb v. Minow, 883 P.2d

-14-

13 65, 13 67 (Utah App. 1994) . The interpretation "must be based on
the language used. . ."
3 67, 3 70 (Utah 1994).

Berrett v. Purser and Edwards. 876 P.2d

The failure to send notice to Arco mandates

the Tax Commission's ruling be reversed.
II.
THE TAX COMMISSIONS DISMISSAL OF ARCO'S PETITION WAS
ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
A.

Dismissal Of Arco's Action Is Unconstitutional.

The State Constitution and the Constitution of the United
States guarantee an individual due process of law.2

The dismissal

of the Petition for Redetermination in this case constitutes a
violation of that right to due process.
the violations
requirements

The elements comprising

include the failure to comport with the notice

(see I. above) and the entry of default, where such

action is not authorized by Rule or Statute, resulting in Arco
being denied the opportunity to have its objections heard on their
merits.
Both the UAPA and the formally adopted Rules of the Utah State
Tax Commission identify the specific instances where a Petition may
be

dismissed

after

a

formal

adjudicative

proceeding

has been

commenced.
The UAPA provides
proceeding

who

fails

that a party to a formal
to

attend

or participate

adjudicative

in a

properly

scheduled "hearing" after receiving proper notice may be dismissed.
Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-ll(1) (b) .

2

U.S. Const, amend. XIV Sec. 1; Utah Const. Art. I §7.
-15-

The UAPA provides for the default of a party only when it
fails to appear or participate in a hearing.

The only hearing

contemplated or identified in the UAPA in conjunction with a formal
agency action is identified in U.C.A. §63-46b-8.

This section

defines the steps and requirements for the actual final dispositive
hearing to determine the various issues set forth in the Petitioner's

Petition for Redetermination.

Nowhere in the UAPA does

it provide for a status conference, let alone providing for the
default of a party who fails to attend one.
The rules adopted by the Utah State Tax Commission likewise
fail to provide that failure to attend a status conference is
grounds for the entry of a default.
The conditions allowing an administrative officer to default
a petitioner are found in R861-1A-KG) (1) (b) . This rule provides
that

dismissal

adjudicative

is

appropriate

proceeding

where,

"A party

to

a formal

fails to attend or participate

in a

hearing;".
The word "hearing" is defined in Rule 861-1A-1 (A) (7) which
provides ""hearings1 means a proceeding, formal or informal, at
which the parties may present evidence and arguments to presiding
officer in relation to a particular order or rule."

The status

conference in this case does not fulfill the role of a hearing.
Indeed the rules of the Utah State Tax Commission provide a
separate definition

for this type of proceeding.

The rules

provide, ""conference1 means an informal meeting of a party or
parties with division heads, officers, or employees designated by
-16-

division

heads

and

informal

meeting

between

parties

to

an

adjudicative proceeding and a presiding officer." R861-1A-MA) (5) .
Nothing in the rules of the State Tax Commission provides for
a "default in the event of a failure to appear at a conference."
There is no allegation made anywhere that Arco
be represented at hearing.

failed to attend or

Only the status conference.

Where neither the statutes nor the rules governing the agency
in question provide authority for entering a default in a situation
where a party fails to appear at a status conference, to dismiss
Arco's Petition on such basis is a clear violation of its rights to
due process.
B.
The Actions Of The Tax Commission In Dismissing The
Petition Were Arbitrary and Capricious.
Aside from the failure of the Tax Commission to follow its own
rules, or the mandated statutes applying to all agencies, in
dismissing the Petition in this matter, the facts of this case
themselves show that the Commissioners' decision to enter a default
in this case was arbitrary and capricious.
The bad faith of the Tax Commission begins with the original
assessments in this case.

The two assessments made were based on

alleged failures to receive sales tax.

The first assessment was

for not charging sales tax to tax exempt organizations such as the
public schools and various churches for materials and services
provided. That particular issue had already been decided in Arco's
favor prior to the audit, and was on appeal to the Utah Supreme
Court at the behest of the Auditing Division.
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Knowing assessment, on that basis, had already been declared
improper,

the

Auditing

Division

made

the

assessment

anyway,

requiring the expenditure of attorney's fees and other costs in
responding thereto.
The

second

assessment

was made

based

on

the Arco' s not

charging sales tax on materials and services provided in installing
a fire alarm system at the Pepcon plant in Cedar City.

Initially,

Pepcon had provided a tax exempt certification and tax exempt
number

to Arco.

Those

documents

later proved

to

be

false.

Thereafter, Pepcon pointed out that the sale and installation of
materials

was

exempt

from

sales

tax

pursuant

to

a

specific

exemption provided by the Utah State Legislature.
The Auditing Division assessed deficiencies against Arco

and

also asserted the same deficiencies against Pepcon who is the
party, if any, who would have been responsible for paying the tax.
Clearly this is not a case where there was any concern about
the Tax Commission's ability to recover the amount of the deficiency, if they were entitled to it, from Pepcon.

This was simply

an additional assessment for no particular purpose except to harass
Arco.
After the Petition for Redetermination was filed, the parties
agreed to a stay of any further proceedings on either assessment
until alternative proceedings dealing with the same or virtually
identical issues were decided. Addendum C.
The first matter was decided, in Arco's favor in Arco Electric
Company v. the Utah State Tax Commission, 860 P.2d 330 (Utah 1993) .
-18-

This left only the issue of the Pepcon assessment.
Commission was already pursuing Pepcon. Addendum C.

The Tax
The Tax

Commission knew what the status of those proceedings were, but
Arco

had no way of getting any information on that subject. This

matter sat for years before counsel for Arco
the Pepcon case had been resolved.

heard a rumor that

Counsel for Arco

then began

seeking an acknowledgment that the matter had been decided and
further sought to discover the result.
Counsel for Arco

was informed that the matter had resolved.

If the representation is true that the Pepcon case was resolved
prior to the dismissal of this action, the failure of the Tax
Commission to inform Arco
faith.

of that is an egregious act of bad

They are the sole entity in possession of the information

that was necessary to either continue or finish this proceeding.
Irrespective of the result rendered in the Pepcon matter,
there could be no further deficiency owed by Arco.

If Pepcon was

successful in establishing that no sales tax should be paid,
clearly there was no sales tax that had to be collected and the
matter has to be dismissed.

If Pepcon was unsuccessful in

establishing that point, then clearly the Tax Commission has a
right to collect that sum from Pepcon, and upon its payment this
matter would be terminated.

If there was a settlement arrangement

entered into between Pepcon and the State Tax Commission, it would
likewise dispense with this matter.

Any such sums paid would

resolve all taxes allegedly owing under the assessment. Otherwise,
as the tax would be owed by Pepcon, with Arco merely acting as a
-19-

conduit to the Tax Commission, Arco

would be entitled to recover

any amounts it had to pay directly from Pepcon.

Accordingly, any

amount recovered would be a double recovery by the State Tax
Commission. Rather than defaulting Arco, Arco's Petition should be
granted, the assessment should be zeroed out and this matter
dismissed on that basis.
The Tax Commission's attempt to saddle Arco

with this debt

while already collecting the same from Pepcon is clearly arbitrary
and capricious and the Order of Default should accordingly be
vacated.
CONCLUSION
The default entered by the Tax Commission should be vacated.
Default for failing to attend a status conference is not provided
for or allowed under either the UAPA or the rules of the State Tax
Commission. Furthermore, there is no competent evidence to support
the findings of the State Tax Commission in entering its default in
the first place.

The failure to find actual receipt by Arco, is

clearly fatal to this action in accordance with the plain language
of the statute and rules in question.
It would be manifestly unjust to allow the default of Arco to
stand where Arco

is not the one who owed the tax, if any was owed,

but merely the party who was to collect it from the party owing it.
This is particularly true when as here the State has already
collected the taxes or found there are no taxes owing (depending on
the outcome of the proceedings the Tax Commission had with Pepcon).
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Arco

respectfully requests this Court therefore vacate the

Order of Default and remand this matter for further proceedings.
Dated this

/

day of July, 1997.
LARSON, KIRKHAM & TURNER

BY

^

J

'?—

S

Shawn D. Turner
Attorney for Petitioner

-21-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 7th day of July, 1997 I mailed 2
copies of Appellant's Brief by prepaid first class mail to the
following:
Gale K. Francis
Assistant Attorney General
Jan Graham
Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140874
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134
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ADDENDUM "A

Appeal No. 93-0237 and 93-0337

DECISION *>ND (TRDEK
The Petition for Reconsideration on Appeal No. 93-0337 was
not filed within the requisite period and therefore is denied on
the grounds of untimeliness. As for the Petition for
Reconsideration concerning Appeal No, 93-0237, Petitioner raises
the issue of notice of the Status Conference which lead to the
dismissal.
Petitioner.

Petitioner points out that notice was not sent to the
However, the Petitioner acknowledges that the notice

was properly sent to the correct address of Petitioner's attorney
of record in this matter.

Therefore, Based upon the foregoing,

it is the decision and order of the Utah State Tax Commission
that the Petition for

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
ARCO ELECTRIC,

)

Petitioner,

}

ORDER

v.

)

AUDITING DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

)
:
)

Anoeal No. 93-0237
"
and 93-0337
Account No* G03 708

)

Tax Type: Sales & Use

Respondent.

STATEMENT OF CASE

This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission upon a
Petition for Reconsideration, dated December 10, 1996, filed by
Petitioner as a result of the Commission's final decision dated
January 4, 1996 for Appeal No. 93-0337 and final decision dated
November 27, 1996 for Appeal No. 93-023 7.
APPLICABLE LAW

Utah Administrative Rule R861-1-5A(P) provides that a
Petition for Reconsideration "will allege as grounds for
reconsideration either a mistake in law or fact, or the discovery
of new evidence."

Under this rule, the Tax Commission may

exercise its discretion in granting or denying a Petition for
Recons ideration.

C E R T I F I C A T E

Utah State

0?

M A I L I N G

Tax Commission
Appeal

Arco E l e c t r i c
VS.

93-0337

Auditing D i v i s i o n

Arco Electric
Petitioner
660 South, 200 East, Ste. 301
Salt Lake City
DT 34111
Turner, Shawn 0.
Attoxney for Petitioner
Larson, Kirkham & Turner
4S1S South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City
OT 34107
Sandberg, Craig
Respondent
Director of Auditing
210 North 1950 West
Salt Lake City
DT 34134
Francis, Gale KAttorney for
Petitioner
ISO East 300 South, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City
DT 84144
Clark, Dee
Representative
for
Petitionei
597 West 2900 South
Sandy
DT 84070

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document
addressed to each of the above named parties.

^i-*n
Date

r\Appeals Staff

{J

Aooeal No. 93-0237 and 93-0337

Reconsideration be deniedDATED this

It is so ordered.

~~1 day of M^VT\0

1997.

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.

UOTICS: You have thirty (30) days after the date of a final
order to file a.) a Petition for Judicial Review in the Supreme
Court, or b.) a Petition for Judicial Review by trial de novo in
District Court. (Utah Administrative Rule R861-1A-5(P) and Utah
Code Ann. §§59-1-501(1), 63-46b-13 ec. sea.)
GSR*9*93-0237.ad

ADDENDUM "B"

ADDENDUM B
Relevant Constitutional Provisions, Statutes & Rules

U.S. Const. Amend XIV
Section 1.
All Persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
Utah Const. Art. I. § 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
U.C.A. §59-1-504. Time determination final
The action of the commission on the taxpayer's petition for
redetermination of deficiency shall be final 3 0 days after the
date of mailing of the commission's notice of agency action.
All tax, interest, and penalties are due 30 days from the date of
mailing, unless the taxpayer seeks judicial review.
As last

amended by Chapter

161,

Laws of Utah 1987.

U.C.A. §63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudicative
proceedings--Hearing procedure
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3 (d)(i) and
(ii), in all formal adjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall be
conducted as follows:
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the
hearing to obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford
all the parties reasonable opportunity to present their
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positions.
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the
presiding officer:
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or
unduly repetitious;
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in the courts of Utah;
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy
or excerpt if the copy or excerpt contains all pertinent portions
of the original document;
(iv) may take official notice of any facts that could be
judicially noticed under the Utah Rules of Evidence, of the
record of other proceedings before the agency, and of technical
or scientific facts within the agency's specialized knowledge.
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely
because it is hearsay.
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the
opportunity to present evidence, argue, respond, conduct crossexamination, and submit rebuttal evidence.
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not a party to the
adjudicative proceeding the opportunity to present oral or
written statements at the hearing.
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as
evidence to be considered in reaching a decision on the merits,
shall be given under oath.
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the agency's expense.
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a person approved
by the agency prepare a transcript of the hearing, subject to any
restrictions that the agency is permitted by statute to impose to
protect confidential information disclosed at the hearing.
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties.
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(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from
taking appropriate measures necessary to preserve the integrity
of the hearing.
U.C.A. §63-46b-ll. Default
(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default
against a party if:
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative proceeding fails to
participate in the adjudicative proceeding;
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to
attend or participate in a properly scheduled hearing after
receiving proper notice; or
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to
file a response under Section 63-46b-6.
(2) An order of default shall include a statement of the
grounds for default and shall be mailed to all parties.
(3)(a) A defaulted party may seek to have the agency set aside
the default order, and any order in the adjudicative proceeding
issued subsequent to the default order, by following the
procedures outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(b) A motion to set aside a default and any subsequent order
shall be made to the presiding officer.
(c) A defaulted party may seek agency review under Section 6346b-12, or reconsideration under Section 63-46b-13, only on the
decision of the presiding officer on the motion to set aside the
default.
(4)(a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the agency, or
in an adjudicative proceeding begun by a party that has other
parties besides the party in default, the presiding officer
shall, after issuing the order of default, conduct any further
proceedings necessary to complete the adjudicative proceeding
without the participation of the party in default and shall
determine all issues in the adjudicative proceeding, including
those affecting the defaulting party.
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(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no parties other
than the agency and the party in default, the presiding officer
shall, after issuing the order of default, dismiss the
proceeding.

U.C.A. §63-46b-16. Judicial review--Formal adjudicative
proceedings
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2)(a) To seek judicial review of final agency action
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner
shall file a petition for review of agency action with the
appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate
rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court
shall govern all additional filings and proceedings in the
appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's
record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are
governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing
transcripts and copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking
judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the
following:
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(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the
agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as
applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by
any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring
resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or
decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed
procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to
disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact,
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by
statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the
agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons
that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency;
or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

As last

amended by Chapter

72, Laws of Utah

-5-

1988.

Utah Admin. R. R861-1A-1. Administrative Procedures Pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. Section 59-1-210.
A.

Definitions as used in this rule:

1.

"Agency" means the Tax Commission of the state of Utah.

2. "Agency head" means the Tax Commission of the state of
Utah, or one or more tax commissioners.
3. "Appeal" means appeal from an order of the Commission to an
appropriate judicial authority.
4.

"Commission" means the Tax Commission of the state of Utah.

5. "Conference" means an informal meeting of a party or
parties with division heads, officers, or employees designated by
division heads and informal meetings between parties to an
adjudicative proceeding and a presiding officer.
6. "Division" means any division of the Tax Commission,
including but not restricted to the Auditing Division, Property
Tax Division, Motor Vehicle Division, Motor Vehicle Business
Administration Division, Data Processing Division, and the
Operations Division.
7. "Hearing" means a proceeding, formal or informal, at which
the parties may present evidence and arguments to the presiding
officer in relation to a particular order or rule.
8. "Officer" means an employee of the Commission in a
supervisory or responsible capacity.
9. "Order" means the final disposition by the Commission of
any particular controversy or factual matter presented to it for
its determination.
10. "Presiding officer" means one or more tax commissioners,
administrative law judge, hearing officer, and other persons
designated by the agency head to preside at hearings and
adjudicative proceedings.
11.

"Quorum" means three or more members of the Commission.
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12. "Record" means that body of documents, transcripts,
recordings, and exhibits from a hearing submitted for review on
appeal.
13.

"Rule" means an officially adopted Commission rule.

14. "Rulemaking Power" means the Commission's power to adopt
rules and to administer the laws relating to the numerous
divisions.
15. All definitions contained in the Administrative Procedures
Act, Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-2 as amended, are hereby
adopted and incorporated herein.
Utah Admin. R. 861-1A-1. Administrative Procedures Pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. Section 59-1-210.
G.

Default.

1. The presiding officer may enter an order of default against
a party if:
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative proceeding fails to
participate in the adjudicative proceedings;
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to
attend or participate in a hearing; or
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to
file a response within the time specified.
Default, however,
shall not be entered against the Commission or any division
without a prior hearing on whether a default should be entered.

2. The order shall include a statement of the grounds for
default and shall be mailed to all parties.
3. A defaulted party may seek to have the Commission set aside
the default order according to procedures set forth in the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
4. After issuing the order of default, the presiding officer
shall either dismiss the appeal or conduct any further
proceedings necessary to complete the adjudicative proceeding
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without the participation of the party in default and shall
determine all issues in the adjudicative proceeding, including
those affecting the defaulting party.
Utah Admin. R. 861-1A-3. Division and Prehearing Conferences
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 59-1-210 and 63-46b-l.
A. Division Conferences. Any party directly affected by a
Commission action or contemplated action may request a conference
with the supervisor or designated officer of the division
involved in relation to such action. Such request may be either
oral or written, and such conference will be conducted in an
informal manner in an effort to clarify and narrow the issues and
problems involved. The party requesting such conference will be
notified of the result of the same, either orally or in writing,
in person or through counsel, at the conclusion of such
conference or within a reasonable time thereafter. Such
conference may be held at any time prior to a hearing, whether or
not a petition for such hearing, appeal, or other commencement of
an adjudicative proceeding has been filed.
B. Prehearing Conferences. In any matter pending before the
Tax Commission, the presiding officer may, after prior written
notice, require the parties to appear for a prehearing
conference. Such prehearing conferences may be by telephone if
the presiding officer determines that it will be more expeditious
and will not adversely affect the rights of any party. Prehearing
conferences will be for the purposes of encouraging settlement,
clarifying the issues, simplifying the evidence, facilitating
discovery, and expediting the proceedings. In furthering those
purposes, the presiding officer may request that the parties make
proffers of proof or written prehearing conference statements as
to what they believe the evidence will show at the hearing.
After hearing such proffers of proof and reviewing written
statements, the presiding officer may then advise the parties how
he views each side of the evidence and state how he believes the
Commission may rule if evidence at the hearing is as proffered at
the prehearing conference, and then invite the parties to see if
a stipulation can be reached which would settle the matter. If a
settlement is reached by way of stipulation, the presiding
officer may sign and enter an order in the proceeding. If a
settlement is not reached, the presiding officer shall enter an
order on the prehearing conference which clarifies the issues,
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simplifies the evidence, facilitates and limits discovery, and
expedites the proceedings to a reasonable extent.

ADDENDUM "C"

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
ARCO ELECTRIC,

V
A

Petitioner,

PREHEARING ORDER

v.
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

Appeal Nos. 93-0237 and 93-0337
Account Nos. G03708 and G02500

Respondent.

Tax Type:

Sales & Use Tax

A prehearing conference was held in the above-entitled
matters

at

9:00

a.m.

on November 23, 1993, Alan Hennebold,

Administrative Law Judge, presiding.

Shawn D. Turner, of Brown,

Larson, Jenkins & Halliday, participated by telephone for Arco
Electric.

Gale

Francis,

Assistant

represented

the Auditing Division.

Utah

Attorney

General,

Craig Sandberg and Anna

Anderson were also present for the Auditing Division.
Based upon discussion among the parties and the ALJ, it
is hereby ordered:
1. The parties agree that these appeals may be resolved
by the parties based upon the results of other appeals now pending
before the Commission.

With the consent of the parties, the

prehearing conference in these matters is continued without date.
2. While these appeals are held in abeyance, the parties
may undertake discovery in an informal and cooperative manner.

Appeal Nos.

3.

93-0237 & 93-0337

The Appeals D i v i s i o n w i l l n o t i f y Che p a r t i e s of any-

future proceedings.
DATED t h i s Z'UK day of U o o g ^ W -

, 1993.

Alan Hennebold
Administrative Law Judge
P\93-O237.pho
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Appeal Nos. 93-0237 and 93-0337
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Prehearing Order to the following:
Arco Electric
c/o Shawn D. Turner
660 South 200 East, Ste 301
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
Craig Sandberg
Deputy Director, Auditing
Heber M. Wells Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84134
Kim Thome
Director, Auditing Division
Heber M. Wells Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT
84134
Gale Francis
Assistant Attorney General
50 South Main Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
DATED this

A

^

day of

Seer

[)OWJAAX*/)

1993

ADDENDUM "D"

BEFORE 1'IiE UTAH STATE TAX, COMMISSION
ARCO ELECTRIC,
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

E etitioner,
v
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE. TAX COMMISSION,.

Appeal No

93-0337

Accoi i 11:11 t: N ::::)

Respondent.

)

Tax Type: Sales k Use

$TATEfWT' OF CfrSS
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission
. ... ,---_ione- s appeal

The Status Conference was held on

December 5, 13 5-., uuawa Turner representing Petitioner and Gale
Francis representing Respondent.

the

Auditing

Division

The parties indicated that all

has retracted

all

asse

petitioner for the period in question I n this appeal.

..gainst
The parties

~3-.w^«. v_**v*v- there are no remaining outstanding issues in this

Appeal No. 93-0337

ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission hereby
orders that this matter be dismissed.
DATED this

H

day of Qanfin^U

, 1996

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.

W. Val Oveson
Chairman

Roger 0. Tew
Commissioner

Jcfer' B. Pacheco
Commissioner

Shearer
Commissioner

^Jui 'dstl^J

NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of a final order
to file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission. If you
do not file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, you
have thirty (30) days after the date of a final order to file a.)
a Petition for Judicial Review in the Supreme Court, or b.) a
Petition for Judicial Review by trial de novo in district court.
(Utah Administrative Rule R861-1A-5(P) and Utah Code Ann. §§59-1601(1), 63-46b-13 et. seq.)
sy934337od
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/#*%*•-

State of Utah
lommission
50 West
Itah 84134

H t

n

*JJ

. •M

Forwarding and Address
Correction Requested

TAX C MMM

)M

17M ^ A<^$S

C E R T I F I C A T E

Utah State

OF

M A I L I N G

Tax Commission
Appeal

Arco E l e c t r i c
93-0337

VS.
Auditing Division

Arco Electric
Petitioner
660 South 200 East, Ste. 301
Salt Lake City
DT 84111
Turner/ Shawn D.
Attorney for
Petitioner
Brown, Larson, Jenkins & Halliday
660 South 200 East, Ste. 301
Salt Lake City
UT 84111
Thorne, Kim
Respondent
Director of Auditing
210 North 1950 West
Salt Lake City
UT 84134
Francis, Gale K.
Attorney for
50 South Main #900
Salt Lake City

Petitioner
UT 84144

Clark, Dee
Representative for
Petitioner
597 West 2900 South
Sandy
UT 84070

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document
addressed to each of the above named parties.

Appeals

